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States have engaged in medical malpractice litigation reforms over the past 30 years to 
reduce malpractice insurance premiums, increase the supply of physicians, reduce the cost of 
healthcare, and increase efficiency.  These reforms have included caps on non-economic 
damages and legal procedural changes.  Despite these reforms, healthcare costs in the U.S. 
remain among the highest in the world, provider shortages remain, and defensive medicine 
practices persist.    The purpose of this study was to determine how successful traditional 
medical malpractice reforms have been at controlling medical costs, decreasing defensive 
medicine practices, lowering malpractice premiums, and reducing the frequency of medical 
malpractice litigation. Research has shown that direct reforms and aggressive damage caps has 
had the most significant impact on lowering malpractice premiums and increasing physician 
supply.  Out of the metrics which were improved by malpractice reforms, similar improvements 
were shown because of quality reform measures. While traditional tort reforms have shown some 
targeted improvement, large scale, system-wide change has not been realized, and thus it is time 
to consider alternative reforms.  




 Introduction         
Over the past three decades, the increased prevalence of medical malpractice litigation 
has resulted in increased malpractice insurance premiums, higher instances of defensive 
medicine practices, and the relocation of physicians of various specialties to more favorable 
jurisdictions.1 To avoid the possibility of a medical malpractice lawsuit, physicians have engaged 
in unjustifiable tests and services, otherwise known as defensive medicine practices, which have 
accounted for nearly 3% of healthcare spending, or roughly $50 billion annually.2 In response to 
this phenomenon, and in an attempt to lower malpractice insurance premiums and keep 
physicians in the state, over half of the United States (U.S.) have enacted state-level medical 
malpractice tort reforms.3  
 “Tort reform” within the healthcare industry has referred to several legislative measures 
aimed to restrict the financial liability to which a clinician was exposed, as well as to provide 
predictability in medical malpractice damage awards.4,5 There have been three distinct periods of 
medical malpractice tort reforms in the U.S.: first in the 1970's, then in the 1980's, and finally in 
the latter part of the 1990s.6  Of the different reforms introduced over these time frames, the two 
most common and impactful were: caps on non-economic damages and the dissolution of the 
legal concept of "joint and several liabilities" as applied to medical malpractice claims.7 Within 
these two reforms, caps on non-economic damages have been the most highly discussed and 
debated.7,8 Supporters such as physicians have argued that non-economic damage caps have 
discouraged unmeritorious claims, ended unrestrained damage awards, and reigned in inflated 
medical malpractice insurance premiums for clinicians.9,4 Detractors of these reforms have 
argued that these caps have been unproductive in achieving their stated aims and have been 
unjustified given the injustice in denying full legal redress to the most injured individuals.10,11 
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 The purpose of this research was to assess the effectiveness of medical malpractice tort 
reforms on controlling medical costs, decreasing the incentive and implementation of defensive 
medicine practices, lowering medical malpractice insurance premiums, and reducing the 
frequency of medical malpractice litigation.  
  
Methodology 
The primary hypothesis of this study was that medical malpractice tort reforms have not 
been effective in achieving their stated aims of reducing healthcare spending, reducing insurance 
premiums, and increasing the supply of physicians on a state by state basis.   
This study took the form of a secondary literature review.  The goal of this study was to 
attempt to prove the hypothesis by a thorough review of existing scholarship on the issue of the 
effect of medical malpractice tort reforms on the varied aims of such reforms.  Any area of the 
hypothesis which could not be efficiently concluded from the scientific literature was identified 
as ripe for more extensive primary data collection in a future study.  
Identified data for this study centered on peer-reviewed secondary sources, written in the 
English language, focused on the effect of tort reforms of the U.S. medical malpractice system, 
and published between the years 2005 and 2017.  The academic database aggregator service 
"MUSummon" at Marshall University, the biomedical literature database "PubMed," 
EBSCOhost, Academic Search Premier, Alt-HealthWatch, LexisNexis Academic, and CQ 
Researcher were primarily used to identify relevant scholarship references. The primary search 
terms utilized to identify academic sources were, ‘tort reforms’ or ‘malpractice tort reforms’ and 
‘medical malpractice’ and ‘damage caps' and ‘physician supply.' 
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 The research focus emphasized the identification of measurable data related to the 
specific aims identified in the hypothesis.  Relevant articles were selected following a review of 
abstract and conclusion sections.  The review yielded 16 total articles, of which seven were 
chosen for inclusion in the Results section of this review.  Additionally, a written semi-structured 
interview with an in-house legal counsel of a healthcare organization was used within the data 
collected.  The semi-structured interview is identified as “In-House Interview, 2017” below.  The 
literature search was conducted by JD and MF and validated by AC who also acted as a second 
reader and verified literature met inclusion criteria.     
 
Results 
Case Study 1: Impact of Malpractice Reforms on the Supply of Physician Services, 2005  
A 2005 study by Kessler, Sage, and Becker focused on how the supply of physicians was 
affected, state to state, because of various medical malpractice tort reforms.  These authors used 
the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile data for each state in the years 1985 
through 2001 to identify the effect of state malpractice law changes on physician supply.  The 
authors examined the impact of "direct" and "indirect" reforms on physician supply.  Direct 
reforms were identified as those which directly reduced malpractice awards – damage caps, 
getting rid of punitive damages, removing mandatory prejudgment interest, and modifying the 
collateral source rule – and indirect reforms were identified as those who only indirectly reduced 
malpractice awards – contingency fee caps, periodic compulsory payments, reforms of joint and 
several liability rules, establishing a patient compensation fund, and reforming statutes of 
limitation.12   
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In states that enacted direct reforms, physician supply increased 8.2% more rapidly over 
the subject period than in states with no reforms.12  The authors found that while this number was 
9.6% when direct and indirect reforms were enacted together versus no change, states which 
passed only indirect reforms experienced a physician supply increase at a rate 3.4% lower than 
states with no reforms.  As can be seen in Table 1 below, results varied by specialty as well as by 
years of experience.  Levels of physicians with more than twenty years of experience rose 21.4% 
more rapidly in states with both direct and indirect reforms as compared to states with no 
reforms.12   
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
Case Study 2: Low Cost of Defensive Medicine, Small Savings From Tort Reform, 2010 
A 2010 study by Thomas, Ziller, and Thayer examined the effect tort reforms have had 
on the overall healthcare cost associated with defensive medicine.  This study utilized data from 
paid medical and pharmaceutical claims of CIGNA HealthCare from July 1, 2004, to June 30, 
2006, measured about medical malpractice insurance data.13  Thomas, Ziller, and Thayer 
reviewed 61 risk categories in 30 states.  The authors examined the cost of an episode of care and 
attributed any single incident to a given physician if that physician was responsible for the 
highest percentage of the professional charge, so long as that rate was at least 30%.  Episode 
costs were increased because of malpractice premiums for 449 physician risk categories.13  
However, ultimately the authors found that a 10% reduction in medical malpractice premiums 
would account for only 0.132% reduction in overall cost of a given episode of care.  This total 
savings percentage would just be 0.4% if medical malpractice premiums were reduced a full 
30%.13   
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Case Study 3: Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away?  Evidence from Tort Reform 
Damage Caps, 2007 
In 2007, Matsa examined the effect of medical malpractice noneconomic damage caps on 
the supply of physicians.  The study utilized physician population numbers from the records of 
the American Medical Association, as reported to the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services Area Resource File.14 The author concluded going into the study that any effect 
on physician supply because of damage caps was dependent on three factors: how much liability 
premiums change relative to cost and profit, how much physicians can pass along costs of 
medical liability to patients and the elasticity of demand for physician services.  The study found 
that damage caps did not increase nationwide physician supply.14  However, the author found 
that while the number of general practitioners was unchanged in rural areas, the quantity of 
specialty physicians raised in rural areas by 10% to 12% as a result of damage caps, resulting in 
an overall physician supply increase of 3% to 5% in rural areas, which contrasted with the no 
change found nationwide.  This disparity was attributed to the different effect of the three factors 
above in rural versus urban areas.14   
Case Study 4: Medical Malpractice Reform: Noneconomic Damages Caps Reduced Payments 15 
Percent, with Varied Effects by Specialty, 2014 
A 2014 study by Seabury, Helland, and Jena examined nationwide medical malpractice 
claims from 1985 to 2010, compared against similar state medical malpractice liability reforms, 
to determine the effect damage caps had on malpractice payments.  The authors examined 
220,653 claims, 33.7% of which were insured claims.  The study found that more restricted caps 
had a more significant effect than less restrictive caps, a $250,000 cap reduced average 
indemnity payments 10% while a $500,000 cap did not affect.15  Further, the authors discovered 
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that more restrictive damage caps had a lesser impact on riskier physician specialties.  However, 
the ultimate finding of the study was that a $250,000 damage cap was effective in lowering the 
cost of malpractice liability for the average physician in the United States, while a $500,000 
damage cap was not effective.15      
Case Study 5: New Directions in Medical Liability Reform, 2011 
In a 2011 study, Kachalia and Mello examined available literature on the effect of the 
eight most common state medical malpractice tort reforms.  The study utilized all relevant 
published literature and government reports through 2009.  The authors found that noneconomic 
damage caps did control the growth of liability insurance premiums.  Likewise, modifications to 
the statute of limitations or statute of repose, also lower liability insurance premiums.16  
However, other reforms such as limits on attorney fees and reforms to joint and several 
liabilities, have not been found to have an effect on insurance premiums or claim frequency.16     
Case Study 6: Tort Reforms, 2010 do not assuage Physicians' Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits 
 A 2010 study by 17Carrier, Reschovsky, Mello, Mayrell, and Katz surveyed physicians 
found in the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile regarding practice 
characteristics and career satisfaction and cross-referenced it with malpractice data from the 
National Practitioner Data Bank.  The survey had a 62% response rate and revealed that 
physicians with fewer than five years of practice had much higher subjective fear of malpractice 
litigation than did those with greater than five years of practice experience.17  This data aligned 
with the opinion of the In-House Interview, in which the in-house counsel stated that the more 
inexperienced providers in the organization had a more significant personal fear of malpractice 
litigation and were more likely to engage in defensive medicine practices as compared to more 
experienced providers.     
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The authors found that fear over malpractice did not significantly change in response to 
malpractice reforms.  Overall, whether a state was a riskier malpractice environment or had 
higher malpractice insurance premiums did not have a significant effect on the subjective fear of 
malpractice experienced by that state’s physicians.17  General reforms such as aggressive damage 
caps and the abolition of joint and several liabilities did have a modest effect on physicians' 
subjective malpractice fears, 0.2 and 2.9 on the study’s malpractice concern scale respectively.17   
Case Study 7: The Impact of Tort Reforms and Quality Improvements on Medical Liability 
Claims, 2015   
  Another study was performed by Illingworth, Shaha, Tzeng, Sinha, and Saleh and 
published in 2015.  The authors examined the effect of traditional tort reforms on 18 Texas 
hospitals as compared to 9 hospitals within the same health system, located in Louisiana, which 
did not enact tort reforms.18According to the authors, a medical liability claim was any legal 
claim brought against the hospital by a patient. 
 In Texas, after tort reforms were enacted in 2003, the average number of medical liability 
claims per quarter dropped from 7.27 to 1.4.18  However, these authors found that medical 
liability claims in Texas rose to the level of 7.2 from a level of 3.0 in the five quarters before tort 
reform was enacted in 2003.  Further, according to these authors, improvements in quality 
measures which were passed in Louisiana also resulted in a significant reduction in medical 
liability claims.  The patient receiving antibiotic within 4 hours of admission had the most 





It has long been a political assumption that medical malpractice liability tort reforms 
would lead to decreased liability insurance premiums, higher supply of physicians, and an 
overall decrease in the cost of medicine.  As a result, medical malpractice reforms have been a 
prevalent political issue for nearly 30 years.  In this time, little has been written or said about the 
human cost or fairness of such reforms as applied to aggrieved patients.  This research review 
has suggested that while direct tort reforms such as aggressive caps on noneconomic damages 
have lowered medical malpractice insurance costs, and increased physician supply in some areas 
and for some specialties, these reforms have not succeeded in reducing the overall cost of 
healthcare.  As such, the hypothesis of this study has been proven to be only partly correct 
insofar as applied to the total cost of healthcare spending.  Further, reforms have had a minimal 
impact on a physician's subjective fear of malpractice litigation, particularly less experienced 
physicians.  Defensive medicine practices have been driven by the fear of malpractice litigation, 
and this has not been shown to respond to reforms.  
 The totality of research has called into question the efficacy of direct medical malpractice 
tort reforms.  While these reforms have provided physicians with more predictability and 
lowered insurance premiums, it has not been significantly increased nationwide physician supply 
or lowered the overall cost of medicine.  Further, evidence has demonstrated that quality reform 
measures have been just as effective at reducing instances of medical malpractice claims as tort 
reforms.  As such, there is a strong argument to be made that the conventional thinking regarding 
medical malpractice reform of the past 30 years should shift to focus more on quality and less on 
restricting the legal rights and options of potential plaintiffs.  
  If noneconomic damage caps are going to be instituted, the evidence suggested that more 
modest caps such as $500,000 caps have not had any effect on malpractice liability.  Only more 
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aggressive caps at the $250,000 level have been found to affect.  Further, evidence has regularly 
shown that less experienced physicians had a more significant fear of malpractice, which tends to 
suggest that physicians education could place a significant role in decreasing defensive medicine 
practices by reducing the fear of malpractice claims.    
 This topic continues to have enormous practical applications for the entire U.S. 
healthcare industry.  As healthcare costs continue to rise, the issue of lowering the costs of 
medicine has continued to be a political topic.  Despite past tort reforms, the problem of reducing 
healthcare costs persists.  Defensive medicine practices have been detrimental to efficiency and 
best practice, and thus if previous reforms have not changed these practices, new improvements 
should be considered.  Per the In-House Interview, defensive medicine practices have led to an 
over-reliance on outside referral, which has made it difficult to provide quality care in rural areas 
with fewer specialists.  Further, less experienced providers have been more susceptible to 
malpractice fears, and this has led to overutilization among less experienced providers.  It is 
enormously important that the healthcare industry institute effective reforms based on evidence.  
The stated goals of tort reforms have been to increase physician supply, lower malpractice 
insurance premiums, and lower the cost of healthcare.  However, all malpractice reforms 
naturally come at the expense of the legal rights and options of potential plaintiffs.  As such, like 
with all of healthcare, it is time to begin re-imagining what is efficient with liability reforms.  
Given the modest effect that tort reforms have had through the years, medical liability likely 
needs to continue the trend present in all of healthcare and begin examining increased quality 
measures as a means of lowering the costs associated with malpractice claims.  
   This study was limited in that the only included primary research into the effect of 
medical malpractice liability tort reforms was a single survey interview with an in-house counsel 
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of a healthcare organization.  Further, this topic continues to be timely, which means that new 
data has been produced all the time.  Also, this study was limited by the bias of the researchers, 
bias of the available publications, limitations of the chosen research strategy, and the number of 
databases utilized for the secondary research. 
 
Conclusion 
Medical malpractice tort reforms have been a prominent political topic for over 30 years.  
Reforms have focused mainly on non-economic damage caps and procedural changes.  However, 
despite these reforms, defensive medicine practices persist.  Healthcare costs continue to be 
alarmingly high due to overutilization and inefficiency.  Given the inability of successful 
improvements to solve the problems partly attributed to malpractice litigation, it is the time that 
the U.S. consider new and innovative medical malpractice tort reforms to provide predictability 























Table 1 – Changes in Physician Supply in Response to Reforms by Specialty/Experience 
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Reforms vs. No 
Reforms 
>20 Years of 
Experience 
All 8.2 18.7 -3.4 13.6 9.6 21.4 
Emergency 7.3 46.7 -19.7 110.7 -2 70.6 
OB/GYN 1.6 9.7 -6.9 6.5 2.3 7.7 
Anesthesiology 5.9 14.7 -7.4 14.3 12.3 21 
Radiology 6.5 11.3 -1.6 10.1 11.1 20 





Questions asked in a Semi-Structured interview of an In-House Legal Counsel of a Healthcare 
Organization. 
1.  Is your office concerned about the practice of defensive medicine? 
2. If yes, why? 
3. What is your sense of how many extra medical services, on average, physicians are providing 
to ensure that patients will not later seek legal action for damages as a result of care rendered at 
your facility? 
4. What physician practice groups or departments are particularly concerned with the threat of 
medical malpractice litigation if any?  Why those departments? 
5. Does your organization hold or offer any sort of training or education regarding medical 
malpractice issues and avoidance?  Why or why not? 
6. How many physicians does your organization employ?  Out of these physicians, what 
percentage have had a claim brought against them for medical malpractice in the past five years? 
7. What is your opinion of the 2003 changes to the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability 
Act which lowered the cap on noneconomic damages for most medical malpractice claims to 
$250,000? 
8. What is your opinion of the 2003 changes to the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability 




9. Has your organization experienced difficulty recruiting any class of physician due to the 
medical liability climate in West Virginia?  Why or why not?  
10 If so, which specialties?  Why those particular specialties? 
Medical malpractice insurance Had premiums risen or fallen over the last ten years?  Five years?  
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